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CYNICISM, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND THE
PROBLEM OF PARADOX: DILEMMAS OF
PUBLIC LAW DISCOURSE
Yvette M. Barksdalet
I think that the real question in this Symposium-the question
that we always seem to be asking in administrative law-is how do we
get government to work well? And, of course, the perennial follow-up
question-what do we mean by "well"? And because there are as
many different answers to this question as there are administrative
scholars, or sands in the Sahara, the real quandary is-whose vision of
the good should a determinedly democratic government in a deter-
minedly individualist, capitalist state legitimately pursue? Unfortu-
nately, the answer to this question is like a vision of sugar plums
dancing in the head of a poor child at holiday-easy to imagine, but
not very easy to come by.
The problem of addressing this question is exacerbated by the
limits of the language of rationality as a means of deciding what good
government is, given the inherent inconsistencies between our shared
societal values: individualism, majoritarian democracy, market capital-
ism, social justice and the rule of law. Each of these norms has legiti-
mating content. Each of these norms conflicts with one or more of
the others. Yet all are so fundamental to our national identity that
choosing between them requires the rejection of key pillars of our
national ethos.
For example, democratic values can conflict with social justice
norms, because democracy purports to legitimate governmental out-
comes merely by process (i.e., democratic approval), without regard
to moral content.1 This democratic legitimization may be appropriate
when the majority uses its power to fight off an oppressive minority
elite. But this democratic legitimization is problematic when an im-
moral majority uses its political power to abuse and oppress a less pow-
erful minority. In that circumstance, democratic values legitimate
t Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL.
1 Although we obviously do not always agree as a society what social or moral justice
is, we do agree that our society should make just rather than unjust social choices. Politi-
cians never brag that they are taking immoral, unjust actions-the public would never
explicitly support such arguments. Rather, politicians seek socially acceptable cover for
unjust proposals (for example, "people are homeless by choice," or if children are poor,
"it's the fault of their parents").
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oppression, and conflict with our similarly shared values of moral
justice.
Witness, for example, the legitimacy nightmare that resulted
from the inability of democratic institutions to remedy the obvious
moral travesty of the system of racial and gender subordination within
society, because of majoritarian support for this subordination.2 Aju-
dicial fiat was required to break the logjam. And the fiat, Brown v.
Board of Education,3 was instantly subject to withering criticism as ille-
gitimate constitutional interpretation, even though it was merely a
remedy-short declaration of abstract rights.
Our democratic values also conflict with our values of individual
liberty and freedom because they similarly privilege collective will
(democratic majorities) over individual liberty. Thus, free market
capitalism values are used as a paradigm that delegitimizes both dem-
ocratic and social justice outcomes as irrational, misguided diversions
from the status quo results of libertarian market transactions. Under
this model, aggregate private market transactions (trades) between in-
dividuals increase social welfare, 4 because they are the result of indi-
vidual free will and thus considered inherently rational.5
Thus the very fact that the market produced a particular result by
definition makes it rational. Accordingly, any harmful consequences
to market actors that result from these market transactions are seen as
inherently legitimate because they are the market's rational allocation
of resources to those (almost always the wealthy) who can best exploit
them 6 instead of those (like the poor) who would squander the re-
sources on less wealth-producing activities like food, rent, clothing,
and health care. This is the market defense of poverty-if people are
poor, it is only because they are ill-equipped to do battle in the mar-
ketplace and thus rationally are denied access to the economic re-
sources of the society. (In other words, they deserve to be poor and
everyone else is better off for it.) This is essentially the argument of
the anti-welfare debate-redistribution of wealth on the basis of need
2 Slavery is an easy example of this problem with democratic legitimation, but it is
also a problematic example. Slavery itself is fundamentally inconsistent with democratic
ideals because of its necessary formal exclusion of slaves from equal participation and sta-
tus in the polity. In contrast, under Jim Crow laws, people of color formally had voting
rights (after the 15th and 19th constitutional amendments), even though their rights were
practically denied.
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 This assumes that (1) both A and B can accurately determine whether they w1il be
better off (perfect information), and (2) their trades do not impose countervailing costs
(so-called externalities) on third parties (say C and D), sufficient to result in a net decrease
in total social welfare.
5 This is because A and B presumedly would never trade unless both would be better
off after the trade.
6 For example, by investing in wealth-producing activities like funding foosball-play-
ing Ivy League dropouts with an awesome idea for a really boffo website.
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to have, rather than ability to earn, squanders the resources of the
society on non-wealth-producing activities (i.e., non-value added
transfers) .7
Although this market model conflicts with the alternative legiti-
mating ideals of democracy and justice, it also reflects fundamental
shared historical social values: "individual liberty and freedom," "pri-
vate ownership of property," and "the possibility of collective social
progress through acquisition of property."
One way to address this dilemma is to try to rationally assign ap-
propriate boundaries for each of these paradigms-for example, con-
stitutional rights limits on the role of democratic institutions,
democratic boundaries on the proper roles for individualism and mar-
ket capitalism, and democratic, individualism, and market limits on
the roles of social justice and morality. However, this approach as well
is problematic as a means of determining the proper role of govern-
ment in our society, because to rationally delineate these values
boundaries you need a super-legitimating norm. What might that
be?8 Without such a principle, the intellectual debate over the bound-
7 This is also the argument against the living wage-that poverty wages are the most
efficient allocation of societal resources. Because this is the wage that the rational market
is willing to pay, adherents argue any other wage is wealth-depleting, not wealth-enhanc-
ing, and thus hurts the poor (who have fewer jobs) as well as the rich (who have fewer
profits).
Private charity is often advocated as one solution to the inequities of wholly market
distribution of wealth-which has the benefit of retaining individualism as a legitimating
norm. For example, Professor Macey's article, Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in
Politics and Constitutional Theoy, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 280 (2002), advocates the concept of
public-service, private-community organizations (private charities, foundations, public ser-
vice) as an antidote to presumably corrupt governmental institutions. In any event, this
private altruism is not a substitute for market power, but simply another form of market
power. That is, the private altruism model continues to leave resource distribution deci-
sions in the hands of market "haves." These private market actors simply create ex-
tramarket mechanisms for their decisions about how to redistribute societal resources.
Those without market power still do not have any control over societal resources. All they
have is charity from those who do. Although this charity may be better than nothing, it is
not a substitute for power. Government, at least, has the prospect of democratic empower-
ment for those with votes, instead of money. (It is unclear why this private charity is not
also seen as a squandering of societal resources on non-market activities. After all, whether
the redistribution comes by way of government, or by way of private "gift-giving," it is still
redistributive. And if redistribution is going to occur, is the whim of rich eccentrics prefer-
able to the outcome of albeit imperfect democratic processes? Alas, at this point someone
would probably make a first-order moral argument against the "coercive state redistribu-
tion of private property." I suppose social justice norms are not always eschewed by market
maniacs.)
8 Basically, this is the continuous debate of constitutional law, which is even more
complicated by the additional baggage of constitutionally predetermined first-order rule of
law choices (themselves internally inconsistent, because they also reflect, indeed signifi-
cantly establish, these conflicting fundamental societal norms). Add to that complexity
federalism, separation of powers, and public/private debates about the inter- and extra-
governmental distribution of the power to make these values-reconciling decisions.
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aries becomes simply another ideological battleground in the warfare
among these legitimating norms.9
The answer may be that you cannot resolve these conflicts. This
is why it is so easy to trash government. Pick a program, pick a para-
digm, you are guaranteed to find a problem. Even the governmental
choice to do nothing is problematic. For example, government inac-
tivity is easily trashed as attributable to the shortcomings of "do-noth-
ing politicians" or "lazy bureaucrats" who have failed to address public
problems (social justice model), or do the public's bidding (demo-
cratic legitimacy model), or, properly correct market failure (market
capitalism model). And, since every government decision has detrac-
tors, whether gored oxes or conscientious objectors, there is rarely a
shortage of trashing volunteers.
However, this trashing obscures the reality that for all the theoret-
ical wrangling, there is still a real-life consequence of governmental
action that people who are subject to it experience, and this govern-
mental action or inaction makes the reality of their lives materially
better or worse. Unfortunately, the consequence of the trashing is
that there is no language which can successfully describe and defend
government efforts to improve that reality which is not itself subject to
withering theoretical (and political) attack.10 Thus, there is no such
thing as defensibly good government, not even no government.
This, it seems to me, is the basic quandary of our social order.
How do you make democratically, morally, and economically legiti-
mate social choices in light of these inconsistent legitimating norms,
9 I have previously argued for consensus-directed government processes for resolving
these values conflicts, as a means of avoiding the difficulties with rationality-based attempts
to resolve fundamental values conflicts. SeeYvette M. Barksdale, The Presidency and Adminis-
trative Value Selection, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 273 (1993). The vision I had in my article was that
isolating the values choices inherent in divisive policy debates would help sparring parties
(such as environmentalists and loggers) arrive at a consensus as to which values mattered
(for example, perhaps the parties could agree that both environmental values and eco-
nomic values mattered-without environmental protection there would be no forests to
log, and without economic well-being there would be no resources to protect the environ-
ment). Once this values consensus was reached, my perhaps idealistic hope was that the
parties would then find a mutually agreeable solution which honored these consensus val-
ues (that both the environment and the economy were important). Thus, the achievement
of a consensus agreement about which values were important to advance would transform
otherwise acrimonious, destructive public policy battles into warm and fuzzy deliberative
dialogues about the best way to achieve mutually agreed upon public purposes. I did not
distinguish between material values (environmental protection, economic protection),
rights-based values (social justice) and process values (democracy), perhaps because my
view was (and I think still is) that all values must be about material well-being (whether
physical or spiritual) in order to have any worth beyond academic fodder for intellectual
jousters. However, consensus-directed processes may do littie good for conflicts among
internally inconsistent categories of values.
10 This is particularly true in this era of media sound bites in which thumbnail invoca-
tions, of one or more of these megalegitimating paradigms is often the sum total of public
political debate.
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when any choice which satisfies one norm simply conflicts with an-
other?'" Perhaps another way to put this is how do you defend any
social choice in society when such choice can be easily delegitimated
simply by reference to one or more of these fundamental yet inconsis-
tent consensus values? This does not mean that the criticism is never
right-just that it is always possible.
The two articles here in many ways reference these normative
conflicts, albeit from oppositional perspectives. Professor Macey's Ar-
ticle12 is a classic demonstration of the power of these legitimating
paradigms for mounting a devastating critique of the worth of govern-
ment action. In contrast, Professor Rubin's Article 13 attempts to cir-
cumvent these normative conflicts by rejecting objective normative
discourse as a basis for legitimating government. Instead, Rubin seeks
to legitimate government not by rational conceptions of the good, but
by the subjective, individual collective will of its citizenry.
Macey attacks government as redistributing societal resources
from rational private markets to corrupt and irrational public
processes, whether rent-seeking democratic politicos or arrogant, fool-
ish bureaucrats. In Macey's view, government is susceptible to three
bad influences: (1) corruption 14 (the financial or electoral bribery of
self-interested public officials by self-interested special interests with a
stake in overactive government), (2) hubris15 (the arrogance of public
officials who use their public offices to impose their own vision of the
good on a captive public), and (3) stupidity (the cognitive biases of a
really confused public who irrationally delude themselves into the
false belief that there are serious social problems that government can
and should solve).
However, Macey goes beyond simply arguing the generally indis-
putable point that government often does bad, stupid, or self-serving
things, to conclude that government is so likely to be defective that
the only sensible response is a position of such relentless cynicism that
persons (for example, voters and academic researchers) should simply
assume that any government action is illegitimate, unless proven oth-
erwise.' 6 Macey wields this "uber" cynicism, which he calls "Macey's
razor," as an acrid tonic for what in his view is government's corrup-
1 1 And this description does not even include rule of law norms as an alternative
legitimating model. This model also lacks moral content (or democratic content-witness
the crisis of democratic legitimacy after the recent presidential election).
12 Macey, supra note 7.
13 Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modem State:
Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 309 (2002).
14 See Macey, supra note 7, at 285-86.
15 See id. at 286-87.
16 See id. at 293-95. And given the problems of imperfect public information about
government, such proof is unlikely ever to occur.
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tion and irrationality. The cynical glance of Macey's razor, he argues,
will defend the public from being fooled into complacency, only later
to sadly discover that greedy, arrogant, bumbling politicos and their
self-serving public patrons sabotaged its public interests. He argues
that Macey's razor will work this magic because the increased public
vigilance will make government more contestable, and thus force gov-
ernment actors to better justify their decisions. 17
However, the possibility that government actors could ultimately
justify their decisions sufficiently to avert the edge of Macey's razor
seems more chimerical than real if the only good government is no
government (and even that may not be good). Macey in fact denies
having this view in the Article, stating that government is not always
bad, it is just not always good.18 However, in supporting this argu-
ment, his triple threat critique of government as antidemocratic, over-
redistributive, and irrational, shows how readily the combined power
of our societal legitimating norms can delegitimate any government
action. In light of this, Macey's razor starts to look more like a
machete.
For example, Macey implicitly argues that good government
might be government "in the public interest," as opposed to in the
self-interest of "special interests" or "bureaucrats."' 9 However, under
Macey's analysis, resort to any of the likely legitimate definitions of
public interest simply opens up the government action to yet another
form of attack.
For example, one classical way to define the public interest is as
the aggregated interests of the individual members of the public.
However, also classically, once one defines the public interest in that
way, it easily becomes disaggregated into multiple individualized self-
interests (or partially aggregated group interests). The legislation
passed in favor of this coalition of disaggregated private interests be-
comes easily subject to attack as merely "corrupt" government for the
private interest, rather than good government in the "public interest."
And because all legislation is passed only if it has support from a ma-
jority coalition of interests, and probably supermajority support given
the requirements of bicameralism and presentment not to mention
consensus procedures in the Senate, all legislation is subject to the
attack on the grounds that it is a "pay-off' to these individuals, rather
than genuinely for the public. (By definition, the "public" apparently
are not members of any of these individual interest groups-which
must mean that the public are the minority).
17 See id.
18 See id. at 290.
'9 Id. at 283.
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Moreover, even if one were to identify a clear separate collective
"public interest," apart from aggregated individual private interests
(perhaps an interest in protection from invasion by hostile forces
would be such an interest-clearly shared by all in society), under Ma-
cey's analysis government action in service of such a public interest
may still not be legitimate. This is because any such government ac-
tion requires, not surprisingly, a government actor. And, according to
Macey, that government actor is likely to merely be using the pur-
ported public interest as a shield to pursue his or her own separate
private interest (whether financial, electoral, or ideological).20 Thus
the apparent public-interested legislator is now vulnerable to attack,
not as being the captive of narrow outside private interests-but even
worse, as pursuing his or her own selfish individual interests. How-
ever, those selfish interests are not necessarily financial (i.e., bribery
or job security), or even electoral (reelection), but they may be ideo-
logical (pursuing his own vision of the public interest, based upon his
own professional bias, rather than objectively true public interest). 21
Case in point: Macey's example of the opportunistic politicians who
use disasters, like earthquakes and floods, to get legislation passed.
Although this legislation appears to be public-spirited, that is pursuing
"disaster relief," Macey argues that the legislation is usually useless for
averting disasters (which were a low risk to begin with), but very help-
ful to the selfish interests of the legislator or of her interest group
constituencies. 22 This legislation is not in the public interest; the pub-
lic interest is simply a cover.
However, Macey's razor can slice too broadly here. The mere fact
that the disaster was only the pretext for the legislation, rather than its
real motivation, does not necessarily mean that the legislation is self-
serving. While it is likely true that clever politicians often exploit me-
dia circuses like disasters to push through their regular legislative
agenda, more so than to solve the purported disaster, this does not
necessarily mean that their regular legislative agenda is not otherwise
in the public interest. For example, a public-interested legislator
might use the fortuitous disaster to pass wonderful public-interested
legislation (in fact, right over the defenses of those other members of
Macey's legislative den of corruption). Of course the legislation may
be simply pay-offs to "discrete, highly organized groups. ' 23 However,
20 And, this bureaucrat, acting in the name of his or her own self-interest, seems even
more chicanerous than those bureaucrats who at least have the public-spiritedness to be
captured by some outside private interest, no matter how narrow.
21 See Macey, supra note 7, at 286-87.
22 See id. at 300.
23 Id.
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this is true of any legislation-whatever was the catalyst for its pas-
sage-whether disaster du jour, or say, party politics. 24
However, note the delegitimating paradigm here is social justice
renamed "the public interest," which now conflicts with democratic
legitimacy (approval by the public who wanted disaster relief). But
the public was self-deluded, and the legislators were professionally de-
luded, so in the end, the public interest was not served after all-as
objectively determined by "Dunno-who was that masked bandit
anyway?"
However, let us assume that the researcher concludes that the
legislator actually does work in the public interest, and the legislation
does benefit the public (i.e., actually averts disasters, or solves some
other significant public problem). Do we now have legitimate govern-
ment? Perhaps. After all, the legislation is not easily categorized as
simply "self-regarding" or "special interest." But more likely, the gov-
ernment program will be criticized as an inefficient wealth transfer,
because innocent private capitalists (regulated or taxpaying parties)
are corralled into insuring greedy rent-seeking beneficiaries (that
"public" of the public interest), from disasters which ought to be their
responsibility. And of course, heaven forfend that these "public" ben-
eficiaries are neither the "majority," nor the wealthy friends of the
innocent capitalists, but rather are the poor, the dispossessed, and the
politically powerless. Then the legislation becomes subject to attack
from all three barrels: antimajoritarian because it helps people who
have no power, redistributionist because it helps people who have no
wealth, irrational because it "pursues someone's own vision of the
good at public expense," "uses the politically powerless as a cover to
benefit the politically powerful," or is the consequence of "cognitive
biased self-delusional altruism." Clearly, government cannot win by
losing here (that is, unless its critics agree to sheath their weapons,
which, if they wield Macey's razor-they never will).
To the extent that Macey argues that government is particularly
prone to waywardness because of its relative power, autonomy, and
insularity he is clearly right. And, he is clearly right that sometimes
government does really stupid (or corrupt) things. He is also correct
that a cautious, careful, watchful citizenry will do a betterjob of polic-
ing government than a naive, gullible one. However, is it really true
that government never acts properly?25 If so, then we need some way
24 Query how the current stream of anti-terrorism legislation stacks up under this
analysis.
25 For example, for all of the controversy, most would agree that environmental laws
have substantially improved the quality of our air and water over the last two decades, even
though there are debates over the economic costs. I am old enough to remember when
the Cuyahoga River in Ohio caught fire because of pollution. Now, apparently, the fish are
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of distinguishing good government from not so good government.
For example, does cynicism require government to stand by idly while
people starve and do nothing until some academic researcher has suf-
ficiently proven that the government program will work? Of course
we should inquire whether government really is working effectively.
Macey is right that defenders of a role for government should be the
first to care about the effectiveness of its policies. However, is Macey's
razor a close shaver or a guillotine which, once loosed, permits no
escape? The question is whether the internal inconsistency of our so-
cietal norms may have in fact deprived us of a language that permits
us to describe when that good government occurs (at least within our
current politicized environment in which no good deed lacks detrac-
tors, and no bad deed lacks supporters) .26
It may be that this normative incoherence in our conception of
government is a necessary prerequisite for public choice theory's per-
suasiveness. Public choice theory is easily criticized as tautological be-
cause its premise (that government actors are self-interested and
behave rationally) necessarily preordains its conclusion (that govern-
ment decisions made by rational, self-interested actors, would in fact
turn out to serve the actors' self interest). Any other result would be
logically impossible, given these premises. 27 The premises could be
disproved by proof of public-interested government. However, the in-
determinacy of our normative conception of the public interest en-
sures that such "proof' of good government will never materialize,
leaving public choice theorists free to label any government program
as corrupt and self-serving, without fear that some do-gooding propo-
nent will prove them wrong.
Additionally, part of the allure of public choice scholarship was
that it purported to avoid these value conflicts by merely being de-
scriptive. It modelled government behavior to empirically determine
whether government was accomplishing its purported goals, but did
not critique the legitimacy of these goals. However, as several com-
mentators pointed out in this Symposium, even descriptive models
contain value choices because given the complexity of reality, the very
act of description requires a simplification of reality (i.e., a choice as
to what to put into the description and what to leave out). Thus, that
very winnowing focus necessarily reintroduces the very same problem
of value choice that the presumedly descriptive enterprise was sup-
back. See Mentor Fire Department Does Its Part on Ozone Days, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Aug.
15, 2001, at B2.
26 Perhaps one silver lining of our current national terrorism tragedy will be a sus-
tained moratorium on the previous decade's scorched earth politics.
27 Unless the rational actors are stupid or ignorant, in which case their decisions are
worse than self-interested-they are arbitrary, serving no one's interest, not even their
own.
[Vol. 87:384
DILEMMAS OF PUBLIC LAW DISCOURSE
posed to banish. This is not necessarily a serious problem, as long as
the model's purpose is simply intellectual enlightenment, or knowl-
edge for its own sake. In this circumstance, the model provides useful
information that is admittedly only as good as its premises, worthwhile
as far as that carries you, but not beyond. However, when the model
becomes the basis for pragmatic real-life decisionmaking, these de-
scriptive choices become problematic because the oversimplification
necessary to say something meaningful risks distorting the public pol-
icy debate by obscuring relevant complexity.
Such is the case with public law scholarship. The simplicity of its
assumptions about the self-interested nature of human behavior is
clearly useful as a means of identifying and analyzing at least some
aspects of government decisionmaking (for example, politicians do
want votes and campaign contributions, bureaucrats do want power,
prestige, and influence, interest groups do want policies that favor
their material or ideological interests, and certainly such concerns
drive at least some of their behavior). However, these assumptions
become dangerous when the conclusions of such scholarship, usually
that the programs are simply sellouts to private interests, become am-
munition in the political debate over the normative desirability of the
programs, even though the simplistic assumptions of public choice
theory necessarily limit the reliability of its conclusions.
This is the jumping-off point of Edward Rubin's article. Rubin
critiques public choice theory as irremediably based upon a flawed
premise-that human behavior can be accurately described as merely
a quest for material self-interest. Rather, argues Rubin, human beings
are immensely more complex than this simplistic assumption, and
seek not simply their material self-interest, but rather a deeper, almost
spiritual goal, the quest for "meaning," that is, some coherent, yet sub-
jective, sense of significance or purpose for, their lives. Accordingly,
argues Rubin, people construct government not simply as a means of
serving their material self-interest, but rather as a means of determin-
ing this "meaning" or "purpose."28
Rubin argues that this view of the citizenry is more descriptively
correct than the rational self-interested actor of public choice theory.
And, instead of Macey's cynical view that government is generally up
to no good, Rubin postulates that government necessarily does good
because it is a vehicle by which the citizenry seek to determine the
meaning of their existence, and thus government has value apart from
its objective benefit to the citizen's material well-being. Rubin argues
that government has a more elevated purpose of helping the citizenry
define their own lives, and collectively, through public discourse and
28 See Rubin, supra note 13, at 328-40.
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"intersubjective dialogue," define a broader meaning and purpose of
their society as well. That is, government is essentially a flow-through
mechanism, by which the citizenry (including government actors)
seek to do good as an expression of their own conceptions of self.29
Macey would probably call this conception of government hubris
(the arrogance of persons who use public offices to impose their own
vision of the good on a captive public). Rubin, in turn, calls Macey's
cynicism (and public choice theory in general), a fundamentally
flawed, reductionist, oversimplistic distortion of human nature, that
flies in the face of reality (and of behavioral science). People are not
the selfish nogoodniks poised at the edge of Macey's razor, Rubin ar-
gues. Instead, they are much more complex psychologically, in that
they seek to structure their lives in ways that can satisfy their primal
search for life's deeper meaning and purpose. And, argues Rubin,
when viewed in this way, it becomes apparent, historically, that govern-
ment has been a more or less effective mechanism for this search.
The administrative state, argues Rubin, is an example of this.A0
Rubin's approach avoids in many ways the normative prison set
up by the inconsistencies in our society's conflicting values because it
abandons the quest to find an objective normative legitimating goal
for government. Rather, Rubin seeks to legitimate government not by
rational conceptions of the good, but rather by deference to the sub-
jective, collective judgment of individuals. That is, government is
good, not because it is objectively correct, or because it does objec-
tively good things, but rather because it reflects individuals' subjective
judgment of how they wish to construct their society. This approach
thus relegates the resolution of any normative conflicts regarding gov-
ernment purposes to the subjective judgment of individuals (includ-
ing voters, politicians, bureaucrats, and academics) rather than the
arguably inachievable objective decision of privileged actors (whether
politician, bureaucrat, voter, or academic).
I was truly fascinated by Rubin's Article because of its potential
for elevating public discourse about government in a way that opens
the door to a much richer discussion of the value of government and
the role of government. One problem that I have, though, with phe-
nomenology as an operating rationale for government, is that it also
does not seem to provide a language for describing good government,
but rather a language which legitimates any government good or bad,
because that government reflects the collective subjective will of the
people, in their perennial quest for meaning. That is, by grounding
government solely in the subjective imaginations of the citizenry,
Rubin's phenomenology, like Macey's cynicism, also disembodies gov-
29 See id.
30 See id. at 345-49.
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emnment from the reality of people's lives, and the question of
whether government is making their lives better or worse.
Regardless of the justifications or nonjustifications of govern-
ment action, there is still a real-life consequence of that action exper-
ienced by real people who are subject to it. The lack of a credible
normative discourse makes it easy to ignore these real-life conse-
quences of government for its citizens, particularly the less powerful
ones. In the case of Macey's public choice razor, this lack of a coher-
ent normative language makes it easy to trash government programs
which might make people's lives materially better. In the case of
Rubin's phenomenology, this lack of any normative language makes it
difficult to attack government programs which might make people's
lives materially worse.3'
Now perhaps Rubin's vision will empower those people materially
affected by government to also use government to vitiate their subjec-
tive meaning. However, one's ability to actually accomplish this feat
practically depends upon one's relative power. Thus, until you have
equality in the distribution of power, only the powerful will be success-
ful at that quest. Perhaps an enlightened ruling class may choose to
help others as a means of finding meaning-but what if they do not?
For example, insiders like professionals and intellectuals can
much more easily use government to achieve their subjective visions
of the meaning of life than the homeless person begging for alms on
urban streets. While these insiders may decide to seek to shift govern-
ment resources towards ameliorating homelessness, that occurrence
would only be fortuitous from the homeless person's vantage point.
These same do-gooders might decide to transfer their altruistic lar-
gesse to symphony orchestras, or space exploration. If so, our home-
less person, despite his own quest for meaning, would likely have little
power to stop them. It is the intersubjective meaning of the powerful
that would get translated into policy-not that of the powerless. Un-
less all citizens get to equally participate in and control this quest for
meaning, then it translates into simply more privilege for the privi-
leged. Indeed, to be honest about it, the journey for subjective mean-
ing seems to be one that only rich people can afford. It is hard to find
time for intersubjective quests when you are worried about food,
clothing, and shelter.
Perhaps, though, Rubin's vision works as a procedural, rather
than a substantive one. That is, it answers a question of collective
choice, how do we structure the society's collective choice mecha-
nisms (whether public or private) to empower all citizens to success-
31 Whether or not people are solely motivated by material self-interest, certainly mate-
rial self-interest is important to them, particularly when they are not rich enough to easily
satisfy their most basic needs, such as food, shelter, clothing, and education.
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fully pursue their quests for meaning (whether through government,
or other means)? If we do so successfully, perhaps we can trust the
citizens to protect their own welfare. However, this requires some
mechanism for addressing imbalances of power.
Perhaps this collective journey requires our society to adequately
prepare and privilege all citizens to participate fully in this quest for
meaning, whether through government or through other means.
That is, if "meaning" is the meaning of life, perhaps a society must
ensure the minimum material preconditions for all citizens to search
for that meaning, such as education, food, shelter, and health care.
And, if so, perhaps citizens will truly gain self-determination and es-
cape the trap of our nation's powerful, yet ultimately incoherent, nor-
mative symbols-so easily manipulated to delegitimate all efforts at
social change.
